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Adaptation finance is primarily allocated to multilateral entities and national governments, 
rather than local organisations. This means that some of the same social, political and 
economic processes that create and sustain inequalities within a country will be the same 
processes that determine how adaptation finance is used. Using an urban lens, we consider 
the obstacles currently faced by local governments and local civil society groups in accessing 
adaptation finance, and show that these are a function of systemic power imbalances 
between levels of government, and between government and vulnerable communities. We 
argue that even relatively small amounts of adaptation finance could have a catalytic effect 
on the capacities and impacts of local organisations, contributing to greater levels of both 
distributive and procedural justice. We analyse different financial intermediaries and 
planning systems that could be used to make disbursements from multilateral climate funds 
fairer and more effective. This could potentially create political opportunities both to 
respond to direct climate threats and to address underlying drivers of vulnerability, such as 
marginalisation and exclusion. In this way, channelling adaptation finance to the local level 





1. More multilateral climate funds should establish direct access modalities, and 
introduce “fit-for-purpose” accreditation procedures and approval processes. Those 
that have already established such enabling frameworks should prioritise providing 
readiness support to local organisations, and incentivise state and citizen 
collaboration in adaptation projects. 
2. National governments should consider clearly enshrining the rights and 
responsibilities of local authorities in National Adaptation Plans, and help them to 
collect the information, build the capacities and acquire the resources needed to 
plan and implement adaptation measures. National governments should further 
encourage local authorities to adopt participatory planning, budgeting, monitoring 
and evaluation procedures to encourage citizen participation. 
3. Local civil society groups should identify or establish collective entities that can seek 
accreditation with multilateral funds and then disburse money to their members. 
Collaboration between groups can facilitate up-scaling through replication 
(particularly where peer-to-peer learning is embedded in the network) and reduce 







Low-income and other marginalised groups will suffer disproportionately from climate 
change impacts. This is because climate risk is not just a product of increased environmental 
shocks and stresses, but also of existing social, political and cultural factors (IPCC, 2014). 
Countries in the global South are more vulnerable than those in the North because they 
have limited resources, inadequate infrastructure and weak systems of governance. Low-
income and other marginalised groups are more vulnerable to climate change than other 
segments of the population because these factors are amplified. Although these groups will 
bear the brunt of its impact, they have contributed the least to climate change (Roberts, 
2009; Schlosberg, 2012). This is widely recognised to be unjust. 
 
We recognise the importance of justice both in terms of philosophical debates about how 
society should be governed and organised (Rawls 1999), and through the priorities of low-
income and disadvantaged groups themselves (Bebbington et al 2010). Fraser (2008) argues 
that there are three dimensions to a relational approach to justice: recognition, 
representation and redistribution. In international contexts, climate justice is widely 
understood to encompass both ‘distributive’ and ‘procedural’ mechanisms (Bulkeley et al., 
2013; Comim, 2008; Grasso, 2009; Paavola and Adger, 2006). Distributive justice describes 
the allocation of costs and benefits. Procedural justice describes the power relations around 
planning and decision-making processes; realising procedural justice recognises and enables 
low-income groups to be involved in decision-making and, potentially, subsequent 
implementation projects.  
 
To date, adaptation finance1 has been viewed in part as a means to increase justice through 
redistributing resources from countries that have generated the greenhouse gas emissions 
that drive global warming, to countries that experience or are expected to experience the 
most severe effects. Where procedural justice has been considered, this has largely been at 
the national and international level: developing countries push to have equal if not majority 
representation on the boards of multilateral climate funds (Ciplet et al., 2013), while donor 
countries are expected to recognise country ownership by providing adaptation finance to 
implement National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). Yet most adaptation finance is managed by 
multilateral entities and national governments, and only a small proportion of resources are 
channelled to the local level, let alone to locally-designed and locally-led resilience 
initiatives (Fenton et al., 2015). This means that resource allocation continues to be 
determined by elites within development agencies and government ministries. In other 
words, some of the social, political and economic processes that create and sustain 
inequalities within a country will typically be the same processes that allocate climate 
                                                 
1 Definitions of climate finance vary: the term can be narrowly used to refer to new and additional public 
finance from global North to South, or more widely to refer to any expenditure on climate change mitigation 
and adaptation (Buchner et al., 2014). For the purposes of this paper, we focus on resources committed to 
support resilience and adaptation activities in the global South as part of the UNFCCC process, and disbursed 
through multilateral climate funds including the Green Climate Fund, Adaptation Fund, Least Developed 
Countries Fund, Climate Investment Funds, Strategic Climate Fund, Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and 
Recovery and Pilot Program for Climate Resilience, among others.  
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finance. Adaptation finance may therefore advance climate justice between countries while 
doing little to enhance climate justice within countries. 
 
One way of delivering greater climate justice is to ensure that climate finance contributes to 
recognition and representation as well as redistribution. This is also likely to result in fairer 
distributional outcomes. The existing literature recognises that a multi-scalar approach, 
supporting participation at a range of different levels, could enhance procedural justice 
(Barrett, 2012; Okereke et al., 2009; Paavola and Adger, 2006). In this paper, we extend this 
principle to adaptation finance, exploring how local organisations – both local authorities 
and local civil society groups – could play a more significant role in its governance and use. 
In light of anticipated increases in flows of adaptation finance, this is an important extension 
of debates around climate justice. 
 
Channelling adaptation finance to the local level may increase distributional justice by 
increasing the share of resources reaching the most vulnerable. More importantly, 
devolving planning and resources to the local level can facilitate access to and influence 
over decision-making for a wider range of stakeholders. Increasing local control over 
adaptation finance offers an opportunity to strengthen civil society and local government, 
and thereby redress power imbalances that fuel inequality and exclusion. We recognise that 
there are risks involved; channelling finance to the local level could support patronage 
networks and clientelism, over-burden local actors with responsibilities beyond their 
existing capabilities, formalise their processes leading to new exclusions, and/or make such 
organisations donor-driven rather strengthening local accountabilities. However, and as we 
explain below, while continuing efforts are required, recent practices have introduced 
methods to reduce these risks. Moreover, it is evident that a more sustainable and resilient 
urban future will be within, and not outside of, local democracy. This is only possible with 
sustained efforts to equip and resource local authorities to respond effectively to challenges 
such as climate change, and to establish processes and systems that enable urban residents 
to hold these public bodies to account and to strengthen co-productive relations to adapt to 
climate change. 
 
While this argument is relevant to a wide range of settings, we focus on urban areas in low- 
and middle-income countries. Due to the concentration of people and economic activity, 
urban areas are highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (Rosenzweig et al. 2011, 
Revi et al. 2014). For example, future water stress is likely to be concentrated in fast-
growing cities (Vörösmarty et al., 2000) while heatwaves will have the most severe 
consequences in cities due to urban heat island effects (McMichael et al., 2006; Patz et al., 
2005). The importance of considering domestic politics in adaptation planning is also 
particularly evident in urban contexts (Bulkeley et al., 2014), where inequality and exclusion 
physically manifest in the juxtaposition of soaring skyscrapers and sprawling, pejoratively 
named “slums”. Adopting an urban lens highlights the political implications of different uses 
and allocations of climate finance, particularly the risk that it will be deployed in ways that 
reinforce rather than redress inequalities. It also draws on new practices of self-organization 
and citizen state collaboration. We therefore illustrate our argument for devolving climate 





In this paper, we outline the ways that local governments and local civil society groups can 
increase the adaptive capacity of urban residents. We then explain our methodology. The 
subsequent section identifies the barriers to disbursing adaptation finance to local 
organisations, illustrating how power relations favouring national and formal agencies 
create various economic, technical and institutional obstacles for local organisations. This 
analysis informs our assessment of the financial intermediaries and planning systems that 
could be deployed to allow local organisations to access adaptation finance. Finally, we 
illustrate how municipal authorities and organised groups of urban residents have used 
small amounts of resources to shift political dynamics. This demonstrates the scope for 




The Role of Local Organisations in Building Climate Resilience 
 
Local governments are often responsible for risk-reducing infrastructure and services, such 
as drains, all-weather roads, emergency services, healthcare and solid waste collection 
(Satterthwaite and Mitlin, 2014). Local governments are additionally responsible for 
designing and enforcing regulatory frameworks that contribute to public health and safety, 
such as building regulations, traffic control, zoning and pollution control (Dodman and 
Satterthwaite, 2008). These powers mean that municipal authorities also have unique 
opportunities to enhance climate resilience. High population density means that local 
governments can provide risk-reducing trunk infrastructure, such as water pipes, sewers 
and roads, at lower per capita cost than in rural areas (Turok and McGranahan, 2013). 
Upgrading well-located informal settlements can facilitate densification, enabling other 
urban residents to relocate away from hazard-prone areas while retaining proximity to 
employment and services.  
 
Both with and without government investment, local civil society groups, particularly 
community-based organisations, can contribute to adaptation both instrumentally (by 
acting directly to address particular hazards) and transformatively (by engaging with social 
and political issues that drive vulnerability in cities and shifting both public opinion and state 
action towards adaptation and mitigation). Firstly, community-based organisations can 
implement development projects which generate immediate livelihood benefits while 
building financial management and implementing capacities at the local level (Sharma et al. 
2014). There is a rich heritage of cost-effective small infrastructure projects that meet the 
needs of residents of low-income and informal settlements, a growing number of which 
show how local civil society groups can reduce climate-related risk: building decentralised 
drainage systems in Gorkahpur, India (Mani and Wajih, 2014); using rainwater harvesting to 
service community sanitation blocks in Kampala and Mbarara, Uganda (Dobson et al., 2015); 
and organised relocation driven by community priorities in Iloilo, the Philippines (Dodman et 
al., 2010). In many cases, low-income urban residents have been able to collectively 
negotiate with local government and then co-produce risk-reducing services and 
infrastructure at a much larger scale (Mitlin, 2008; Watson, 2014). These community-led 
approaches can help blend priorities of different groups and over different timescales, 
enabling low-income and marginalised urban residents to address adverse shifts in climate 




Secondly, local civil society can act in a more transformative way by mediating between 
individual and collective responses to climate impacts. Norms around participation in 
decision-making determine whose voices are heard and whose interests are represented in 
political processes (Tyler and Moench, 2012). Involvement is recognition and representation 
in itself; but it also builds a platform for further justice though strengthening the individual 
and collective capabilities of marginalised groups. Community-based organisations that 
facilitate collective action are likely to increase resilience, for example because members are 
more likely to pool resources and share information about risks and opportunities (Agrawal 
et al., 2008). Grassroots organisations may provide a conduit for information between local 
government and residents, strengthening accountabilities between citizens and the state as 
networks of community organizations ensure that policies, programmes and decisions are 
made public. Simply improving access to knowledge can build adaptive capacity (Williams et 
al., 2015),  but it is worth highlighting that this information flows both ways: local 
governments can disseminate information through community-based organisations, but 
organised groups of urban residents have a much better understanding of stressors and 
priorities on the ground, particularly in informal settlements, than government 
representatives (Ayers, 2011). Drawing on this local knowledge to guide adaptation planning 
and investments can generate additional poverty reduction and livelihood improvements 
(Archer et al., 2014; Fenton et al., 2014). These relationships with government bodies can 
also facilitate better representation and participation in decision-making processes, 
ensuring that public interventions engage with issues of power, voice and equity, rather 
than reinforcing adverse structures and processes (Friend and Moench, 2013; Chelleri et al., 
2015). Strengthening community networks and federations and building institutional links 
between these aggregations of community associations and local government builds civil 
society-driven accountabilities that can prevent abuse. Innovations in new forms of 
organization and relations within communities and between communities and the state are 
on-going but progress is already evident (ACHR, 2017). 
 
Local organisations will only contribute substantively to resilience if they are accountable to 
those who most sensitive to climate impacts. This means that both municipal governments 
and civil society groups must be responsive to local needs and concerns, with mechanisms 
for meaningful citizen participation and oversight. Otherwise devolution of powers and 
resources is unlikely to address current practices of elite capture and will also fail to address 





This discussion draws on our individual and collective experiences with climate change 
adaptation in urban areas. We have participated in the strategies, plans and activities of 
numerous agencies working at multiple scales from the very local (i.e. informal settlement 
neighbourhood) to the international. Through our long-term exposure to the perspectives 
and work of a range of local civil society organizations, including community groups, 
national and international federations of shack dwellers, informal workers associations and 
NGOs, we have understood both the potential contribution of these groups and the 
obstacles that they face to effective action. Particularly important has been our exposure to 
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the urban social movements of SDI, their associated professional support agencies and their 
local funds, and their partnerships with local authorities.2 We have been directly involved in 
capitalising, evaluating and designing financing mechanisms to channel international 
development assistance to grassroots organisations of the urban poor, and have assisted to 
document and share this work.  
 
Our engagement with local government has also been important, both in the provision of 
basic services and informal settlement upgrading, and in their work to respond to climate 
change and its effects. This has included engagements with the work of individual municipal 
authorities in Africa and Asia (including training municipal officials on adaptation planning), 
and participation in meetings and activities that have framed collective views and 
sometimes formal statements such as the Durban Adaptation Charter.3 Our work with local 
civil society organisations and local governments has taken place over the last 20 years and 
in cities in more than 15 countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.  
 
In terms of a methodological tradition, this research approach is very similar to the form of 
political ethnography described by Auyero (2006); repeated encounters have enabled us to 
engage with the realities of politics as observed by multiple individuals who have offered 
insights into “…the texture of political life, and the plight of political actors”, as well as 
political processes and outcomes (page 258). In particular, we have been actively involved in 
diverse initiatives to channel international public finance (including from multilateral climate 
funds) to local urban organisations. In this paper, we bring this detailed knowledge and 
experience of local civil society groups and local government to international debates 
around the governance and distribution of climate finance. 
 
 
Barriers to Channelling Adaptation Finance to Local Organisations 
 
                                                 
2 SDI are an international network of federations of women-led savings schemes based in informal settlements 
and other low-income neighbourhoods, and their support NGOs. The federations are active in over 500 cities 
around the world. 
3 The Durban Adaptation Charter was initiated at UNFCCC COP17 in Durban in 2011, and has more than 1000 





Figure 1. Barriers to directing international climate finance through and to local-level organisations. 
There are significant obstacles to distributing climate finance to the local level (Figure 1). 
These barriers are not equal, and do not occur at the same time. Notably, some climate 
funds are only permitted to provide funding to national governments, while others can only 
offer loans with a sovereign guarantee. The legal definitions of which organisations are 
eligible to receive climate finance might be the first, insurmountable barrier for local 
organisations, such that the others are ultimately irrelevant.  
 
The direct access modalities of the Adaptation Fund and Green Climate Fund, and the small 
grants programme of the Global Environmental Facility, offer alternatives to this centralised 
approach. These modalities devolve project implementation to entities that have satisfied 
an accreditation process and secured a ‘no objection’ letter from the national designated 
•Sub-national governments and civil society from the global South are excluded from 
national and international decision-making processes.
•Informal organisations are often excluded from formal decision-making processes 
(Oberlack and Eisenack, 2014).
•Accountability is structured upwards rather than downwards, so that donor interests 
outweigh recipient needs (Barrett, 2012; Barrett, 2014).
•Multi-level governance arrangements constrain scope for action by local governments 
(Gouldson et al., 2015; Kithiia, 2011), with local organisations viewed as competitors for 
limited funds rather than delivery partners (van Kerkhoff et al., 2011). 
Structuring of participation
•Climate finance can often only be distributed to central governments or with a sovereign 
guarantee (Paulais and Pigey, 2010; van Kerkhoff et al., 2011).
•Local organisations often lack the legal powers (municipal authorities) or rights 
(community organisations) to implement key adaptation measures (Oberlack and 
Eisenack, 2014).
•Governments at all levels may refuse to work with or even recognise residents of 
informal settlements if they see them as illegal (Satterthwaite et al., 2007). 
Legal obstacles
•Donors often display a preference for large-scale projects, as small-scale projects are 
thought to have higher transaction costs (van Kerkhoff et al., 2011).
•The lending criteria of multilateral funds indicate a preference for investments in 'hard' 
infrastructure such as sea walls, which tend to be delivered by high-level government 
bodies, rather than 'soft' infrastructure such as capacity building and raising awareness, 
which tend to be delivered (and required) by local organisations (Fankhauser and 
Burton, 2011).
Economic requirements
•Local organisations often lack the technical capacity to navigate the institutional 
architecture of climate finance or to implement adaptation projects (e.g. for urban 
planning, project design and delivery). 
•Local civil society organisations and local government may lack the financial capacity to 
manage large sums of money or to leverage co-financing; these agencies also have 




authority or focal point. While direct access modalities offer much greater scope for local 
organisations to plan and manage projects financed by the multilateral funds, preliminary 
quantitative analysis demonstrates that this potential is not being realised. Figure 2 presents 
the value of monies committed by the Adaptation Fund and the Green Climate Fund as of 
March 2017. Only 36.2 per cent of resources committed by the Adaptation Fund and only 
6.2 per cent of those committed by the Green Climate Fund are to National Implementing 
Entities: the remainder has been or will be disbursed through International Implementing 
Entities such as the multilateral development banks and United Nations agencies. Figure 2 
further shows that only a tiny number of the successful National Implementing Entities have 
been local civil society organisations, while no sub-national governments have directly 
received finance from this channel. A separate study suggests that under 10 per cent of 
finance from specialised climate funds was approved for locally-focused climate projects 





Figure 2. The value of climate finance committed by the Adaptation Fund and Green Climate Fund to different 
implementing entities.4 
 
Central governments may also be unwilling or unable to support projects led by local 
governments or local civil society groups. Few low- and lower middle-income countries have 
the enabling multi-level governance arrangements in place that could equip local authorities 
to act effectively on climate change (Gouldson et al., 2015; Kithiia, 2011). City governments 
not only face the challenge of poor coordination among agencies; sometimes, national 
governments can actually view sub-national governments as competitors, either for limited 
funds (van Kerkhoff et al., 2011) or for political power (Resnick, 2011). 
 
                                                 
4 Data drawn from the project databases of the Green Climate Fund 
(http://www.greenclimate.fund/projects/browse-projects) and the Adaptation Fund (https://www.adaptation-
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Local civil society groups are likely to face even more pronounced barriers than sub-national 
governments. Many are composed of people and communities that are systematically 
marginalised, either informally or by law (for example, women, ethnic minorities and 
migrants). Formal agencies may refuse to recognise those that they deem illegitimate, such 
as the residents of “illegal” settlements (Satterthwaite et al., 2007). Because people who 
live in informal settlements are rarely recognised by, or represented in, government, they 
have limited avenues to demand greater distributive justice. In many cities of the global 
South, governments have actively thwarted organised groups of urban residents seeking to 
improve service delivery (Tacoli et al., 2008). These systemic power imbalances contribute 
to vulnerability, yet can also make it difficult for the most vulnerable to benefit from 
adaptation finance: a stark example of climate injustice.  
 
 
Integrating Local Organisations into the Landscape of Climate Finance 
 
To contribute effectively to both distributive and procedural justice, the global adaptation 
finance architecture needs to channel funds more effectively to local civil society 
organisations and local government. Although local organisations can advocate for change, 
they cannot dismantle many of these barriers themselves. They will typically need to work 
through financial intermediaries and experiment with new financial planning systems to 
access adaptation finance. Donor agencies and national governments may also need to take 




Financial intermediaries are the agencies that enable climate finance to flow from its source 
to users (Kaur et al., 2014). Only accredited entities may submit proposals to multilateral 
climate funds, so local organisations must either achieve accreditation or work with an 
accredited entity. The accreditation process is intended to ensure that climate funds are 
disbursing resources to entities with satisfactory fiduciary, environmental and social 
policies, and entails complicated application, evaluation, monitoring and reporting 
procedures. 
 
Some local organisations may be well-positioned to seek accreditation, particularly if they 
have expertise in project financial structuring, due diligence and operational and 
management activities. Compliance with climate funds’ criteria might be relatively 
straightforward for, for example, the small number of city governments in the global South 
that have achieved satisfactory credit ratings in domestic capital markets, such as Cape 
Town, Mexico City and Mumbai. Some local civil society organisations may also have 
established sufficiently rigorous fiduciary, environmental and social standards, particularly if 
they have previously sought international development assistance.  
 
Yet navigating the stringent requirements of the multilateral funds poses a significant 
organisational and financial challenge to most potential local users of adaptation finance 
(Afful-Koomson, 2015; Druce et al., 2013). Moreover, the emphasis on strong financial 
management favours vertical authority and centralised decision-making, overlooking 
consequences for organizations that prioritise horizontal accountabilities. There is evidence, 
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for example, that the allocation of adaptation finance has sometimes been determined by 
the political and economic preferences of government more than by the nature and level of 
vulnerability (Barrett, 2015). Formalisation also favours the participation of those who are 
literate and formally educated, and many community networks seek to ensure the equal 
participation of those whose homes and livelihoods are embedded in the informal sector. 
Hence compliance may exacerbate recognised problems in local organizations. 
 
There is therefore a need to identify or establish accredited entities that are both willing to 
work with local organisations and able to secure approval (and possibly a sovereign 
guarantee) from the national designated authority. One promising strategy is aggregation, 
whereby local organisations collectively establish an agency or network that can seek 
accreditation and then disburse money to its members. This could ensure that local actors, 
particularly those at the level in which adaptation is operationalised, are involved in 
formulating and implementing projects. It could also facilitate horizontal replication, 
whereby successful initiatives are reproduced in multiple locations through knowledge 
transfer and peer-to-peer learning (Fenton et al., 2014). From the perspective of multilateral 
climate funds, agglomeration can also reduce the transaction costs associated with 
accrediting multiple entities and managing myriad smaller projects. And aggregations can 
strengthen social accountabilities minimising both the risk that local elites will capture 
benefits and that processes will be poorly designed and inappropriate for the most 
disadvantaged groups. 
 
Municipal governments could apply through national agglomerations such as the municipal 
development funds established in Brazil, Colombia and Morocco. They could also 
collaborate through city networks, which have an impressive record in fostering, supporting 
and implementing climate action (Castán Broto, 2017). The C40 Cities Finance Facility, for 
instance, has been capitalised by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (BMZ) and the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) to support the preparation of bankable climate projects, develop the financial 
capacities of city administrations and initiate partnerships between cities and prospective 
financiers (including climate funds) (C40 Cities, 2017). 
 
Local civil society groups can similarly collaborate to establish subsidiaries that comply with 
international accounting procedures without disadvantaging the very members that the 
network has been established to serve. Notable examples include the Urban Poor Fund 
International (managed by and for SDI), which has channelled $20 million to its members, 
and the Asian Coalition for Community Action, which has channelled $10 million to its 
members (Mitlin, 2013). These funds are governed by representatives of national 
federations of slum/shack dwellers and were initially capitalised by members’ savings. As 
the Urban Poor Fund International achieved compliance with donor requirements, these 
savings have been blended with grants from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency.  
 
However, the onus of urban climate justice should not be entirely on local organisations: 
multilateral climate funds also have responsibilities to further justice through improving 
their distributions and procedures. Accordingly, climate funds can support local financial 
intermediaries by establishing direct access modalities, as the Adaptation Fund has done; 
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introducing “fit-for-purpose” accreditation procedures and simplified approval processes for 
small-scale projects, as the Green Climate Fund is doing; and by providing readiness support 
to local organisations and/or networks of such organisations.  
 
 
Financial Planning Systems 
 
Financial planning systems play an important role in governing flows of climate finance. 
These can be formal or informal, and within or among organisations (Kaur et al., 2014). 
Effective local use of adaptation funds will require institutional and organisational 
arrangements to be based on the principles of subsidiarity, where matters are handled by 
the lowest or least centralised competent authority, and partnership, where all actors 
recognise that different constellations of individuals and organisations may be best 
positioned to deliver different goods and services.  
 
With respect to subsidiarity, specific responsibilities should be defined in legislation along 
with adequate powers and resources to plan, regulate and manage provision of 
infrastructure and basic services. National governments can support local organisations by 
collecting information, investing in in human capital, disseminating best practice, 
establishing clear regulatory frameworks and providing adequate resources (Ayers, 2009; 
Fünfgeld, 2010). Some central governments have demonstrated their willingness to channel 
climate finance to the local level: Nepal has committed to invest at least 80 per cent of 
climate-sensitive expenditure at the local level, which gives local organisations the mandate 
and resources to coordinate adaptation planning (Sharma, 2014), while Kenya is establishing 
devolved and participatory agencies to secure and disburse climate finance, building on the 
success of the Isiolo County Adaptation Fund (Hesse and Pattison, 2013). However, it is 
important to recognise that in many cases such legislation is of little meaning as it has no 
influence over government practices. Financial planning systems need to be sensitive to the 
underlying incentives and shadow systems that drive or constrain good practice (Leck and 
Roberts, 2015).  
 
The principle of partnership is particularly important where local governments are unable to 
deliver basic services and infrastructures: citizens and communities seeking to fill the gap 
should be accepted and supported. Yet discussions about adaptation planning and 
budgeting systems have largely neglected the importance of legal and budgetary 
instruments that allow input from citizens and communities (Schaeffer and Yilmaz, 2008). 
Without measures being introduced that enable participation, the devolution of climate 
finance to local government may exacerbate bureaucratic control and patronage, rather 
than increase local discretion and downwards accountability (Mansuri and Rao, 2013). 
National governments can advance procedural justice by encouraging local governments to 
adopt participatory budgeting systems, a common practice in Brazilian cities (Cabannes, 
2004), or participatory monitoring and evaluation procedures, as Uganda has done (Lwasa, 
2015). There remains a risk that climate and other development interventions could serve 
the interests of the elite, but a commitment to recognition and representation could “shift 




While there is some acknowledgement of the potential role for local communities in 
receiving adaptation finance, there are concerns that existing climate funds are not taking 
on this challenge (for example, see Funder et al., 2015). The gap between declaration and 
practice may reduce the legitimacy of international agencies and result in increasing 
frustration within local communities in need. Citizen engagement with government should 
therefore be incentivised by the adaptation finance architecture in order to enhance the 
adaptive capacity of the most vulnerable. The planning and budgeting systems for 
adaptation finance need to include bottom-up processes to link local organisations with 
accredited entities. This must be more than access to information, permission to co-produce 
services or the right to make complaints: local civil society groups should be involved in 
decision-making around the allocation and use of adaptation finance. The cross-cutting 
nature of adaptation means that these reforms offer a platform to enhance procedural 
justice in all aspects of urban governance. By raising the profile and amplifying the voice of 
vulnerable residents, these changes to the climate finance architecture positions them to 
engage with wider fiscal policy, social policy, and the efficiency, accountability and 
transparency of public expenditure (Schaeffer and Yilmaz, 2008).  
 
 
A Virtuous Cycle of Locally-Led Development? 
 
This assessment of the adaptation finance landscape suggests that there are financial 
intermediaries and planning systems available that could be used to deliver resources from 
multilateral climate funds to the local level. Yet the scope to channel adaptation finance to 
the local level is curtailed by processes that favour the national over the local and the formal 
over the informal, reflecting long-standing power relations and potentially preventing the 
citizen empowerment needed to address the underlying drivers of climate vulnerability. 
 
In most contexts, two substantial changes are necessary. First, national and multilateral 
agencies need to recognise the critical role that both local civil society organisations and 
local governments can and should play in adaptation. Second, this paradigm shift must drive 
national and multilateral agencies to change norms of representation and redistribution, so 
that the agency and priorities of groups vulnerable to climate change are at the heart of 
decision-making. Tackling both issues could catalyse a virtuous cycle, whereby local civil 
society organisations working with local government can demonstrate their contribution to 
urban resilience, thereby securing further support that in turn enhances their ability to act.  
The opportunities for transformative change are apparent when we consider two specific 
examples: improved financial management by city governments and changed urban 
planning practices driven by community saving groups. 
 
Many local municipal authorities depend on transfers from state and central governments, 
while others rely on narrow revenue bases: revenues of local governments in India, for 
example, were less than 1 per cent of national GDP in 2007-2008 (Rao and Bird, 2010) and 
expenditure by local governments in sub-Saharan Africa was less than 8 per cent of central 
government expenditure (UCLG, 2010). It is therefore unsurprising that local governments 
struggle to provide basic services and infrastructure, let alone redress historical 
infrastructure deficits. Adaptation finance cannot meet this shortfall, partially because of 
the sheer scale of infrastructure investment needs and partially because climate funds will 
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not allocate resources to organisations that are unable to demonstrate robust fiduciary 
practices.  
 
In order to satisfy the fiduciary principles and standards of climate funds, local governments 
will need to improve and demonstrate their financial credentials.5 They can do this by 
implementing discrete, cost-effective projects, and/or by through better collection of local 
revenue. Readiness funding could support the processes of developing bankable project 
proposals and improving municipal practices, while the prospect of securing adaptation 
finance may provide the necessary incentive for city leaders. While adaptation finance may 
be the short-term goal, these steps would also help local governments to increase local 
revenue generation, improve the regulatory environment for private investment and gain 
access to debt finance (bank loans and domestic capital markets). This has been the 
experience of Kampala: incentivised by the possibility of issuing a municipal bond, the city 
government succeeded in increasing local revenue streams by US$10 million in 2010/11 to 
US$30 million in 2014/15 (KCCA, 2016). In most cities, improved tax collection and access to 
bank loans could support climate-relevant and risk-reducing investment on a much larger 
scale than climate finance. Using adaptation finance to support and incentivise the 
development of key capabilities – planning and budgeting, project implementation, financial 
management – could thereby have a multiplier effect on municipal authorities’ ability to 
lead and deliver climate-resilient development.  
 
Faced with political exclusion and inadequate access to financial and other services, 
community savings groups have emerged as a way for urban residents to better use 
resources. Savings provides a platform to organise and mobilise urban residents, who 
subsequently negotiate and advocate to secure land tenure and basic services. As the 
groups have demonstrated their accountability and effectiveness, donors and governments 
have begun to supplement community savings with development assistance and public 
finance as outlined above (also: Bolnick, 2017). Funds such as the Urban Poor Fund 
International continue to be locally managed, so any investments incorporate local 
knowledge and are primarily accountable to communities rather than donors.  
 
These community savings groups have underpinned a mass movement that has catalysed 
broader political change by incentivising decision-makers to listen to low-income groups 
(Mitlin, 2013). There are varied manifestations of community funds that use local savings to 
change urban planning practices and leverage additional public resources. For example, the 
City of Harare has co-financed an upgrading fund with SDI to enable organized communities 
to take loans for infrastructure improvements (Shand, 2015), while the SDI affiliate in India 
has been able to access state and market subsidies to provide new dwellings and upgrade 
informal settlements (SPARC, 2015). Archer (2012) summarises the experience of the Asian 
Coalition of Housing Rights with catalysing city development funds in Thailand, while ACHR 
(2017) expands on the outcomes that five member organizations have achieved. In each 
                                                 
5 For example, the Green Climate Fund requires all entities to have statements that provide information on 
their financial position (assets, liabilities and fund balances), financial performance (income and 
expenses/revenue and expenditure); cash flows; and accounting policies administered transparently in 
accordance with pertinent regulations and laws (GCF, 2011). Many municipal authorities do not have the 
necessary track record in the preparation of business plans, financial projections and budgets, or the 
evaluation of performance and expenditure against these. 
14 
 
case, a relatively small fund created from savings has enabled a radical shift in urban 
governance, with greater recognition and representation of low-income groups as a 
precondition for substantial redistribution. Disbursing adaptation finance to community-
based organisations of this kind could amplify their achievements, equipping them with the 
platforms and financial capacities to build more equal partnerships with government 
agencies and to hold those agencies accountable to urban residents (Newell, 2008).  
 
We recognise that adaptation finance cannot, on its own, overcome all sources of social 
injustice and disadvantage. However, channelling international resources to the local level 
could help to address the underlying causes of vulnerability, such as exclusion and 
marginalisation, and contribute to greater climate justice. The experiences of city 
creditworthiness initiatives and community saving groups illustrate the way that small 




Using Adaptation Finance to Enhance Procedural Justice 
 
Too often, the idea of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ is applied only among 
rather than within nations. Even in a single city, communities will have differing obligations 
to mitigate and different adaptation needs (Dodman, 2009; Steele et al., 2015). Similarly, 
adaptation is too often understood as a technical or technological matter, inspiring debate 
around the design of infrastructure rather than the design of organisational practices and 
relations (Pelling, 2011). These tensions are particularly manifest in contexts of urban 
inequality, where prevailing modes of development either relegate disadvantaged residents 
to risky areas (such as floodplains) or create additional hazards in low-income areas (such as 
air pollution) (Shi et al., 2016). Climate change will only exacerbate these injustices. 
 
Meaningful and long-term adaptation will require – but should also contribute to – reform 
of existing social and political structures. Currently, the climate finance architecture risks 
entrenching differential access to state investments and continuing political exclusion 
(Barrett et al., 2013). Neither the conclusion that climate change responses should be just, 
nor the observation that many adaptation processes are exclusionary are new. Our 
contribution is to argue that there are emerging capabilities particularly within some local 
civil society agencies that enable these outcomes to be reversed, and to demonstrate how 
this might work with respect to adaptation finance.  
 
Three interventions appear both important and over-due, and in this respect there is the 
potential for multilateral climate funds to offer global leadership.  
 
1. Appreciation of the significance of community-led organizations in addressing the 
needs of the most vulnerable citizens, and the establishment of more inclusive 
processes and structures at the international, national and sub-national scales to 
ensure that vulnerable groups can access and influence decision-making. These 
reforms must go beyond narrow interpretations that focus on national 
representation, for example, on the boards of climate funds.  
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2. Commitment to distribute adaptation finance to organizations of those vulnerable to 
climate change. This should happen through three routes; direct to international 
networks of community-led organisations where possible; to joint projects of local 
civil society and local government; and to national agencies working in partnership 
with community-based organisations. These changes should be designed to 
encourage greater recognition, representation and redistribution within cities and 
countries. 
3. An active programme of research and learning to understand what works in terms of 
improving the use of adaptation monies so that the benefits identified above can be 
secured.  
 
These recommendations highlight that recognition is a precondition for furthering other 
facets of justice, whether procedural or distributive (Bulkeley et al., 2014). They also 
underscore the importance of attributing rights and responsibilities across different scales. 
Local organisations can and arguably should undertake to improve their fiduciary 
procedures and social and environmental standards. In a suitably enabling environment, this 
can have a transformative effect on their capacities to respond to climate change. However, 
multilateral climate funds must also adopt various innovations and reforms if they are to 
contribute to enhanced justice below the national scale. The aim of both top-down and 
bottom-up efforts should be to facilitate meaningful public engagement in urban climate 
adaptation planning and implementation, through some combination of participatory 
decision-making processes and robust partnerships between key public and civil society 
actors (Chu et al., 2016). 
 
Resourcing and empowering local civil society groups and local government can 
instrumentally reduce vulnerability by improving their ability to (co-)produce services and 
infrastructure that reduce exposure to risk. Perhaps even more importantly, this approach 
offers new incentives for national governments to support and collaborate with local 
governments, and strengthens the power of community-based organisations trying to hold 
governments accountable to citizens. In this way, disbursing adaptation finance to local civil 
society organisations carves out the political space for them to use adaptation as a means to 
pursue justice across multiple dimensions of urban development.  
 
While challenging power relations in this way is likely to be politically contested in both 
international and domestic arenas, we argue that adaptation finance should be delivered in 
ways that enhance procedural justice as well as distributive justice. This means that it must 
be deployed in ways that reconfigure political relationships to promote more inclusive 
processes as well as more equitable outcomes. Only then can adaptation finance begin to 
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